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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceeding in the District
Court, excluding the defendant who settled out:
1. Cameron Smith, Plaintiff, represented by counsel J. Paul Stockdale, both of Ogden,
Utah.
2. Bank of Utah, Inc., represented by their counsel RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON Salt Lake City, Utah (030906813 CV - District Court).
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I
CAMERON SMITH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Priority No. 15

v.
PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH
and BANK OF UTAH, Inc.,
Defendants/Appellees.

Court of Appeals
CaseNo.20050797-CA
Second District
Case No. 030906813 CV

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) and Utah Rule of App. P. Rules 3 and 4. Pursuant to §78-2-2(4), Utah
Code Ann., the Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

i
1. Whether as a matter of law the Bank of Utah owes a safety design and engineering
duty to a bicyclist traversing a public sidewalk when it constructs an outdoor teller drive
thru and diverts the drive thru traffic across the public sidewalk and back onto a public
road.
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment presents only questions of law, we
review the trial court's decision under a standard of correctness, according no deference
to the trial court's legal conclusions.11 Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d
788, 790 (Utah Ct App. 1998). "In evaluating whether the trial court was correct in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ruling there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts and inferences in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party/1 Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v.
Wasatch County, 40P.3d 1148, 1151 (Utah App. 2001).
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: Notice of Appeal (R. 370-372);
Appellant's Docketing Statement. (R. 382-394)
APPLICABLE STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-19(1)
§ 41-6a-1008 (2005)
§ 41-6a-216
§41-6-100
§41-6-80.5
§41-6-87.3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE: this appeal is from the summary judgment of the
Second District Court, Weber County, which entered a judgment as a matter of law that
the Bank of Utah owed no duty to the Appellant herein and dismissed the suit.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW:
1. Complaint was filed against Appellee on August 26,2003.
2. Bank of Utah filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 18, 2005 alleging that the
Appellee owed no duty as a matter of law to the Appellant.
3. Appellant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment on June 10, 2005.
4. On August 4, 2005 the Court heard oral arguments then ruled from the bench in favor
of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5. Subsequently the Court entered an order granting Appellee*s motion for summary
judgment ruling that the Appellee owed no duty to the Appellant as a matter of law.
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
The Appellant herein was riding his bicycle on a paved sidewalk in front of the Bank of
I
Utah next to a building that created a blind approach to the drive thru teller window
patrons attempted to enter a public roadway. The patrons could not avoid physically
entering the sidewalk with their vehicles to get a view of whether or not there was
someone on the sidewalk. A car driven by a patron of the Appellee drove past the blind
corner thru the sidewalk and collided with the Appellant. From this the Appellant
suffered serious and irreparable injuries to his knee.
Trial Court's Findings of Fact
1. Appellant Cameron Smith was involved in an automobile-bicyclist collision on or
about March 31, 2003 at approximately 2605 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah.
(R. 367)

4

2. Tanisha Phitsnoukanh was exiting from a teller drive-thru owned by Appellee
Bank of Utah, and failed to stop or slow down as she went across the sidewalk and struck
I
the Appellant on his bicycle. (R. 367)
3. Phitsnoukanh had used the teller exit at least once a month over the course of a
year before the March 31, 2003 collision. (R. 367)
4. Phitsnoukanh testified that before the collision she knew there was a sidewalk
running along Washington Boulevard in front of the teller exit and that she would
typically stop to look for pedestrians. (R. 367)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5. Appellant Cameron Smith had rode a bicycle along the sidewalk where the
collision occurred approximately three or four times prior to the March 31, 2003
collision. (R. 368)
6. As Appellant Cameron Smith approached the teller exit, he slowed his bicycle to
gauge traffic and to watch for approaching vehicles. (R. 368)
7. Appellant Cameron Smith testified that Phitsnoukanh was coming very quickly
looking down and that she did not stop at the stop sign or the sidewalk. (R. 368)
Trial Court's Conclusions of Law
1. The determination of whether Appellee owes Appellant a duty of care is a
question of law to be determined by the Court. (R. 368)
2. Defendant Phitsnoukanh had a duty to yield the right of way to Appellant
Cameron Smith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-80.5 and §41-6-100. (R. 368)
3. Appellant Cameron Smith had a duty to operate his bicycle on a sidewalk at a
reasonable speed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-87.3. (R. 368)
4. The legislature has not imposed a statutory duty on a landowner such as Appellee
Bank of Utah to protect pedestrians/bicycles using a public sidewalk. (R. 368)
5. Appellee Bank of Utah did not owe a common law duty to protect
pedestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk. (R. 368)
6. Appellee Bank of Utah did not owe a duty of care to Appellant Cameron Smith as
a matter of law. (R. 368)
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i
1. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to Appellee Bank of Utah's
lack of duty to Appellant Cameron Smith in this case and therefore, Appellee Bank of
Utah is entitled to summary judgment. (R. 369)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I
The Appellee owes a duty when it undertakes to use its land in a manner that poses
a danger to the public using a public right of way. Here, the Appellee built a drive thru
window which it knew or should have known was going to be misused by its patrons in a
way that made it dangerous for those traversing the sidewalk in front of the drive-thru in
danger.
I. ARGUMENT
BANK OF UTAH HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO
PROTECT PEDESTRIANS FROM HIGH TRAFFIC
USAGE CAUSED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THEIR DRIVE THRU TELLER WINDOW
i
A, Marshalling the Evidence
Requirement of marshalling evidence in support of an appeal applies only to
challenges of factualfindings,not to conclusions of law. See Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d
193 (Utah 2000). And because the Appellant is not challenging thefindingsof fact but is
concerned only with the ruling as a matter of law, the marshalling of the evidence is not
necessary under the circumstances. The Appellant is challenging the trial court's ignoring
an expert opinion which basically said that but for the design of the Bank of Utah drive
thru the Appellant would not have been injured.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is only proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions onfile,together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). For purposes of such analysis, the
Court must "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, f 10,48
P.3d235.
However, when negligence is alleged, as in this case before the Court, "summary
judgment should be granted with great caution...." English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154,
1156 (Utah 1989). As the Supreme Court further stated:
4

It is only when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable
conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues become
questions of law.' Accordingly, summary judgment is reserved for
only the most clear-cut negligence cases.
Id. (citations omitted.)
Bank of Utah, as the landowner holding property upon which an artificial
condition caused an injury to the Appellant, cannot sidestep its liability by claiming it
owed no duty to warn Appellant of the danger to be encountered, or to otherwise take
reasonable and simple measures to eliminate the risk of this type of accident from
occurring. The Bank of Utah should owe Appellant a duty, as a matter of law when it
created the artificial danger which brought both Appellant and Phitsnoukanh together.

C

Duty as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At least two separate sections of the Restatement provide for Appellee's liability.
Thefirstdeals with artificial conditions upon land affecting travelers upon an adjacent
public highway. The second, imposes a duty upon a landowner if the traveler will either
not discover the danger, or, having discovered it, cannot be expected to reasonably avoid
it Under either analysis, Bank of Utah owed Cameron a duty to protect him from exiting
vehicles, which Bank of Utah failed to do.
(a)

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368

Utah follows the general rule with regards to duties of landowners to others:
A landowner may use his property as he sees fit, subject, however, to
having due regard for the safety of others who may be affected by it.
The owner is under an obligation to make such reasonable use of his
property that it will not cause unreasonable harm to others in the
vicinity thereof.
Schulz v. Quintana, 576 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1978). Many of the cases addressing such
liability deal with a public highway or right-of-way adjacent to such land, like the case at
bar. In those instances:
Once a highway has been established there is an obligation upon the
occupiers of abutting land to use ordinary care to see that the
passage way is reasonably safe for travel.
Id
These requirements mirror the duty set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 368, which reads:
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an
excavation or other artificial condition so near an existing highway
that he realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk
to others accidentally brought into contact with such condition while

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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traveling with reasonable care upon the highway, is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to persons who:
(a) are traveling on the highway, or
(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel
Bank of Utah's egress, with its dangerously limited field of vision to the south,
and which does not allow for viewing pedestrians until after the vehicle has entered the
sidewalk, is an artificial condition upon its own land, which abuts and crosses over the
public sidewalk. Bank of Utah should know that the "blind corner" creates an
unreasonable risk that pedestrians and others traveling on the sidewalk could be struck by
an exiting vehicle. The limited field of view of the exiting driver also establishes that
Bank of Utah cannot reasonably rely upon the ability of the driver to see pedestrians in
order to discharge its duty. (R. 164, 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact Nos. 2, 3 and 7.
See also pictures R.202 and 204.) Drivers are not able to see until they have begun to
travel into and over the sidewalk area. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 8. R.202
and 204.) This is especially true in light of the way that many patrons exit the Bank's
facilities without slowing or stopping at the stop sign. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed
Fact No. 6.) Accordingly, Bank of Utah owed Cameron a duty to use reasonable care to
warn him of the potential harm.
(b)

Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 343 and 343A

Bank of Utah may argue that under §§ 343 and 343 A, the Bank owed no duty to
Appellant or any other travelers upon the sidewalk, because the danger posed by the
obscured driveway was 'open and obvious.' First, then this should be a jury question.
And second, under this analysis, Appellant has to show that Bank of Utah "(a) knows or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they

%

will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c)
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger." Hale v. Beckstead,
I
116P.3d 263, 266 (Utah 2005) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343). This
is not the complete standard, however, as both 343 and 343A must be read together. Id.
Importantly, § 343 A provides that "the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of
public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that
the harm should be anticipated." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A (2).
It seems beyond argument that "[a] pedestrian has the right to assume that the
sidewalk is in a reasonably safe condition, and to act upon that assumption." Salt Lake
Citvv. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 272, 159 P.2d 149 (1945). The fact that the public is
entitled to use this right-of-way across Appellee's land to traverse the city should also be
noted. Because the sidewalk is open for the use of the general public, and because

<

travelers and pedestrians thereon have the right-of-way (see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 416a-1008 (2005)), the harm that occurred in this case - a driver unable to see approaching
i

travelers on the sidewalk entered the sidewalk from behind the obstruction and there
struck the Appellant - should be anticipated. Additionally, the harm can be anticipated
because so many drivers enter the sidewalk without slowing or attempting to see
approaching travelers. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 6.) Accordingly, Bank
of Utah should realize that pedestrians and other travelers on the sidewalk would assume
safe passage, absent Digitized
some by
sort
of warning from the landowner. While Bank of Utah
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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provides a stop sign for drivers exiting Bank of Utah's property, the Bank provides no
warnings or protection for the passing traveler. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No.
5.)
As to the obviousness of the danger posed by Bank of Utah's exit, the facts of this
particular case point out that even limited awareness of the potential danger is not enough
to guard against the harm. For drivers exiting the bank, the ability to see approaching
pedestrians is necessary before they can comply with their statutory duty to avoid
colliding with pedestrians on the sidewalk. However, the obstruction of the driveway
makes that impossible, without the drivers first entering into the area of the sidewalk. (R.
165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 8.) Likewise, while pedestrians and other travelers
upon the sidewalk might recognize that vehicles are crossing the sidewalk and could
present a danger to the person on the sidewalk, a traveler might not discover the danger
until it is too late to avoid it, as was Appellant's misfortune. (R. 164 Appellant's
Undisputed Fact No. 1.) Bank of Utah cannot expect travelers on the public way to stop
prior to proceeding, as those on the sidewalk are reasonable in assuming that the way is
safe and acting upon that assumption. Pedestrians or other travelers also should not be
required to cross Washington Boulevard, a busy thoroughfare in its own right, in order to
avoid the danger posed by Appellee's egress. Based on all of these factors, Bank of Utah
owed Appellant, as well as the public at large, a duty of care, a duty that it could not
satisfy by simply placing a stop sign near the sidewalk, and otherwise failing to warn or
protect passersby from exiting vehicles.
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D.

Statutory basis for imposing duty of care on Bank of Utah
At the time of the accident and injury in question, Utah state law imposed an

affirmative duty on private property owners to maintain their property free from any
obstructions to drivers.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-19(1) (recently amended and recodified

as § 41-6a-216) provided in relevant part:
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his property any
tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of it, which, by
obstructing the view of any operator, constitutes a traffic hazard.
The use of the word "shall" in the statutory language makes the provisions mandatory for
the property owner, Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah App. 1992).
Accordingly, a landowner has the affirmative duty to remove obstructions from his
property.
Likewise, Bank of Utah owed a duty to Appellant to maintain the property
abutting the public sidewalk and the egress from its property free from obstructions of
any kind. The fact that Bank of Utah did not do this directly caused the accident at issue.
Appellant clearly indicated that he had difficulty seeing any approaching vehicle exiting
the drive-thru as a direct result of the obstruction directly adjacent to Bank of Utah's exit.
(R. 164 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 1.) Tanisha Phitsnoukanh also stated that she
could not see anyone approaching from the south as a result of the building directly
adjacent to the exit. (R. 112 Appellee's Undisputed Fact 10.) Finally, Officer Peterson
attributed the accident to the fact that the driver, Tanisha, could not see Appellant
approaching as a result of the building obstructing her view. (R. 164, 165 Appellant's
Undisputed Fact Nos. 2 and 3.) Dr. Gomer likewise stated that the building prevented
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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exiting drivers from seeing pedestrians and others traveling on the sidewalk from the
south. (R. 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 7.) The state of Utah places a duty on
property owners to prevent these traffic hazards to keep people in Appellant's position
safe from harm. The Court should not permit Bank of Utah to avoid this duty and escape
liability for its negligence.
E.

Duty recognized by the Court
Even if the Court did not determine that Bank of Utah owed Appellant a duty

under the foregoing arguments, consideration of the factors generally giving rise to a duty
establishes that such a requirement should be placed on Bank of Utah in this instance.
Imposition of a duty is based on four factors: foreseeability; likelihood of injury; the
magnitude of the burden on Bank of Utah to guard against that injury; and the
consequences of placing that burden upon Bank of Utah. Little v. Utah Div. Of Family
Serv,, 667 P.2d 49, 54-55 (Utah 1983).
"The mere fact that a particular kind of accident has not happened before does not
... show that such accident is one which might not reasonably have been foreseen." Rose
v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, % 15, 67 P,3d 1017 (quoting Williams v. Melbv, 699
P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1985)). However, the risk of injury and potential for harm to
pedestrians and passers-by should have been known and obvious to Bank of Utah.
Accordingly, once Bank of Utah knew or should have known of the danger, it had to take
reasonable and appropriate steps to warn a passerby of that potential danger.
In Boggs Exrel Boggs v. Lay, 164 S,W.3d 4 (Missouri App.Ct. 2005) the
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against an abutting landowner because two of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

vehicles that were ingressing and egressing the property had parked on each side of the
driveway to which he was exiting. The truck to his left would not let him look down the
street, the truck to his right would not let him look up the street and therefore he pulled
out into the street and was hit by a third car. The Court essentially ruled as follows:
I
"An abutting owner will be held liable for injuries sustained by travelers
lawfully using the road as a result of the condition that the owner has been
instrumental in creating or maintaining." ' 164 S.W.3d at 16.
The Court further stated:
Missouri Court recognized two exceptions to the general rule that
an abutting property owner is under no duty to maintain a public
road in a safe condition. Under the first,' special-use' exception,
a duty will be imposed when an abutting property owner puts an
obstruction on the public road which was not a part of the
original construction in order to serve his own purposes, or, when
the abutting owner has made use of the public road for some
other purpose than merely using it as a road, such as a driveway
or a public walkway.

I

164S.W.3datl6.

<

The Court further stated thus: " . . . the abutting owner will be liable when he uses the
road for his own private benefit or convenience and fails to exercise reasonable care to
i

prevent injury to persons lawfully using the way." Boggs, supra. J64 S.W.3d at 16.
See also, O'Connell vs. Roper Electric Company, Inc. 498 S.W.2d 847 (Mo,
App.Ct. 1973) (holding that an abutting landowner had a duty to maintain that portion of
the public roadway that it had fenced off and used as a private walkway for it's
employees).
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While the Court in the Boggs, supra, case held that the Defendant was not
responsible to the Plaintiff under a special use doctrine because other people were
allowed to use the street, however the Court ruled that the Defendant did have a duty
under the second exception to the general rule that an abutting property owner is under no
duty to maintain the public road in a safe condition. Under the second exception, a duty
is imposed on an abutting property owner when he artificially creates, through negligence
or affirmative action, a condition on a public road which makes passage unsafe. When
the abutting property owner creates a dangerous condition on the public road the law will
impose a duty of reasonable care to guard the public from injury.
Finally, the Court stated: "[Defendants] operation of the red - green light for
access on to its scales, its closure of the MO-CON parking lot, and its instructions that the
first - priority mill haulers should pass the other, parked trucks, all affirmatively created a
condition on Holt Street that made passage unsafe. Because the convergence of
[Defendants] actions created a dangerous condition on Holt Street, we hold it had a duty
to exercise ordinary care to guard the public from injury." Boggs, supra, 164 S.W. 3d at
17.
It should also be noticed that the Defendant in the Boggs case tried to make the
defense that it was the truck drivers acts of blocking the Plaintiffs driveway that acted as
an intervening cause the Court disagreed stating:
Here [Defendant] set in motion the chain of circumstances
leading to the Plaintiffs injuries . . . .
The truck drives actions of blocking the Plaintiffs driveway
were not wholly independent and unrelated to [Defendants]
conduct, but rather flowed from [Defendants] actions.... The
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truck drivers action of blocking the Plaintiffs driveway did not
interrupt the chain of events set in motion by [Defendant] but
rather, instead, contributed to the events leading to the P laintiffs
injuries. And thus, accordingly, the truck drivers actions did not
constitute an intervening cause so as to sever the causation
between [Defendants] conduct and the Plaintiffs injury.

I

Id
A review of the remaining factors also weighs in favor of imposing this duty on
Bank of Utah. The likelihood of injury is great; at a minimum, drivers exiting via the
egress in question could not see pedestrians or travelers approaching from the south,
increasing the probability of a collision between a vehicle and a pedestrian. (R. 164, 165
Appellant's Undisputed Fact Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 8.) Such a collision, even at low speeds,
would carry a high likelihood of injury. When weighed against the simple and relatively
inexpensive remedies - e.g., a mirror, signage and other visual and auditory warnings for
persons utilizing the sidewalk - imposing a duty on Bank of Utah seems quite minimal
(R, 165 Appellant's Undisputed Fact No. 9.) Likewise, requiring other persons or entities
to take precautions to warn passersby of possible danger is to be encouraged, not
minimized. When any person creates or enhances the risk to pedestrians, that person
should be under a duty to take reasonable steps to promote and ensure the safety of the
pedestrian.
Love v. Clam Box, Inc., 232 N.Y.S,2d 924 (N.Y. Sup. 1962) concrete laid in front
of the door which acted as ingress and egress to a public restaurant but was a public
sidewalk and therefore not under the care or control of the restaurant. The court ruled:
Even if the defective condition (in this case freshly laid cement) was
in the public sidewalk and thus part of an area over which defendant had no
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control and no duty of maintenance, nevertheless since it was contiguous to
the door used for ingress and egress, defendant's duty of protection and
warning to its patrons would not lessen. Whether it was the defendant who
caused the work to be done in which event it is charged with actual notice,
or whether it was done by one not engaged by said defendant, the very
nature of the defect might justify an inference by a jury that the defendant
was, or should have been, aware of the concealed hazardous condition, and
was negligent in not posting a warning or in not erecting a barrier.
232N.Y.S.2dat925,926.
In Krug v. Wanner, 145 A.2d 612 (NJ. 1958) the court stated:
[0]ur courts have justly not permitted it to defeat recovery where the
injured party established that the condition of the sidewalk was actually the
result of the abutting owner or occupier's own wrongful conduct or
constituted, in broad legal contemplation, a nuisance which the abutting
owner or occupier had either originally created or had thereafter
participated in maintaining. (Citations omitted.)
145A.2dat615.
An abutting landowner may be held liable to a pedestrian injured by a defect in a
public sidewalk where, inter alia, the landowner negligently constructed or repaired the
sidewalk or otherwise created the defective condition, or caused the defect to occur by
some special use of the sidewalk. Utah follows this general proposition. In Rose v. Provo
City, 67 P.3d 1017(Utah App. 2003) this court ruled: "When an abutting landowner
makes 'special use' of a public sidewalk, or as in the present case, a planter strip, he has a
duty that runs with the land to use 'due care' to keep it in a 'suitable and safe' condition
for the public to travel over." 67 P.3d at 1021.
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In Conrad v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 542 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1975) the Supreme
Court of Utah stated:
The court apparently assumed that the Bank owed no duty to the
plaintiff, since it did not own the land wherein lay the hole. This is a false
assumption. By utilizing the area between the street and sidewalk and by
undertaking to keep it level, the Bank became charged with a duty to do so
in a nonnegligent manner the same as if it had owned the land.
542P.2datl090.
In Tripp v. Granite Holding Co., 450 P.2d 99 (Utah 1969) the Supreme Court ruled:
"There exists no obligation on the part of an abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining his
premises in repair, nor is he liable for any state of disrepair. His obligation can only arise
where he creates through use or otherwise some unsafe or dangerous condition."
(Emphasis mine.) 450 P.2d at 99. Clearly the Supreme Court recognized in 1969 a duty if
the abutting property owner creates through use, or otherwise, some unsafe or dangerous
condition. This is exactly what the Bank of Utah did.
In Salt Lake City v. Schubach, United Pac. Ins. Co., Intervener, 159 P.2d 149
(Utah 1945) the Supreme Court in viewing the liability of an adjoining property owner to
a pedestrian on the sidewalk stated: "The adjoining owner has no more right than any
other person to do an act which renders the use of the sidewalk hazardous, or less secure
that [sic] it would be but for such an act. When he does so he is guilty of a nuisance and
liable to any person, who using due care, is injured thereby." 159 P.2d at 152.
Although the facts of the case at bar are not exact the surrounding states to the
state of Utah recognize the general proposition that an abutting owner of property may
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have a duty imposed for creating a danger which causes a sidewalk to become unsafe.
Arizona had a law requiring the abutting landowner to keep the sidewalk safe for
travelers, but such duty is not absolute and in Beltran v. Stroud, 160 P.24 765 (Ariz.
1945) the Arizona court acknowledged that where obstruction of street is unlawful and
detracts from travelers' safety, author of obstruction will be liable for injuries resulting
from its maintenance although other causes subsequently arising contribute to injury.
"Where one obstructs a highway in such a manner as to cause pedestrians to walk on or
near the paved portion thereof, he may reasonably anticipate that injury to a pedestrian
may occur. In any event, it would be a question for the jury under all the facts and
circumstances of the case." 160 P.2d at 768.
See also Cobb v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 114 P.2d 904 (Ariz. 1941)
(Abutting property owner owes duty to public to do no affirmative act that will create a
dangerous condition in the street fronting his property); McKinley v. Fanning, 595 P.2d
1084 (Idaho 1979) (Abutting property owner owes duty to public to do no affirmative act
that will create a dangerous condition in the street fronting his property); Key v. Lerner
Shops of Colorado, Inc., 472 P.2d 752 (Colo. App. 1970) (Owner or occupant of property
abutting public sidewalks owes no duty to pedestrians to keep the walk free from ice and
snow which has accumulated through natural causes; however, the owner may not create
a hazardous condition on a public sidewalk by negligently constructing or maintaining his
premises so as to discharge water on the walk.); Herndon v. Arco Petroleum Co., 536
P.2d 1023 (Nev. 1975) (In action brought by pedestrian against service station after
pedestrian slipped on icy portion of service station private driveway which crossed public
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sidewalk and broke his hip and leg, there was material fact issue, precluding summary
judgment, as to whether service station's special use of portion of driveway, rather than
natural accumulation of ice and snow, resulted in hazard encountered by pedestrian.); and
Pauley v. Newman, 92 P.3d 819 (Wyo. 2004) (Homeowner owed duty of care to
pedestrian to clear ice on sidewalk near homeowner's garage only if ice was result of
unnatural accumulation of precipitation or if homeowner created or aggravated the
hazard.)
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Appellant Cameron Smith respectfully requests that
Appellee Bank of Utah's Summary Judgment be overturned. At the very least it should
be an issue for the jury to determine where fault lies in the injury to Appellant.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2006.
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C

J. PauyStockdale
Attorneys(for Appellant Cameron Smith
By:
J. Paul Stockdale
Attorney for Appellant Cameron Smith
Original Signature
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-2-3

(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court h a s sole discretion in granting or
lenying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
>ourt of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
eview those cases certified to it by the Court ofAppeals under
lubsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
f Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its
9view of agency adjudicative proceedings.
2001
8-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

8-2-4.

S u p r e m e Court — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s p r o tempore, and p r a c t i c e of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
ridence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
tanage t h e appellate process. The Legislature may amend
te rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
ourt upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
' t h e Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
te Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
dges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties,
idges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
tah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
w, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
scipline of persons admitted to the practice of law.
1986
-2-4.5.

Admission t o s t a t e bar — Criminal h i s t o r y
background checks.
(1) The U t a h State Bar shall require each person applying
• admission to the U t a h State Bar to submit a complete set
fingerprints for the purpose of conducting a national crimd history background check.
2) Fingerprints of applicants for admission to the Utah
ite Bar shall be submitted to the Department of Public
fety, Bureau of Criminal Identification to be used to conduct
criminal history background check and to the Federal
r e a u of Investigation to obtain a national criminal history
jkground check.
3) The criminal history background information obtained
m the Department of Public Safety and the national crim1 history background information obtained from the Fed1 Bureau of Investigation p u r s u a n t to this section may be
id by t h e Utah State B a r to determine an applicant's
xacter, fitness, and suitability for admission to the U t a h
t e Bar.
2001
2-5. R e p e a l e d .

1988

2-6. Appellate court administrator.
h e appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
port staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Lrt and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and
port staff shall be established by the appellate court
linistrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
rt.
.
1986

Section
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.
78-2a-6.

568
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records
and information — Governmental immunity.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court ofAppeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
1986
78-2a-2. N u m b e r of j u d g e s — Terms — F u n c t i o n s —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more t h a n three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court ofAppeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per a n n u m or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render j u d g m e n t in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court ofAppeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court ofAppeals may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n two
successive terms. The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from t h e office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of t h e Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of t h e Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of t h e Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
1988

78-2a-3. Court of A p p e a l s jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
5-7. Repealed.
1986
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
5-7.5. S e r v i c e of s h e r i f f t o court.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includl e court may at any time require the attendance and
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
ices of any sheriff in the state.
1988
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
1-8 t o 78-2-14. R e p e a l e d .
1986,1988
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service CommisCHAPTER 2a
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
COURT O F APPEALS
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direcion
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
a-1.
Creation — Seal.
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78-1-2.2. N u m b e r of d i s t r i c t j u d g e s .
The number of district court judges shall be:
(1) four district judges in the First District;
(2) 14 district judges in the Second District;
(3) 28 district judges in the Third District;
(4). 12 district judges in the Fourth District;
(5) five district judges in the Fifth District;
(6) two district judges in the Sixth District;
(7) three district judges in the Seventh District; and
(8) two district judges in the Eighth District.
2004
78-1-2.3. Number of j u v e n i l e j u d g e s and j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
The number of juvenile court judges shall be:
(1) two juvenile judges in the First Juvenile District;
(2) six juvenile judges in the Second Juvenile District;
(3) nine juvenile judges in the Third Juvenile District;
(4) four juvenile judges in the Fourth Juvenile District;
(5) two juvenile judges in the Fifth Juvenile District;
(6) one juvenile judge in the Sixth Juvenile District;
(7) two juvenile judges in the Seventh Juvenile District; and
(8) one juvenile judge in the Eighth Juvenile District.
2005

78-1-2.4,78-1-3.

Repealed.

1996

CHAPTER 2
SUPREME COURT
Section
78-2-1.

Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and
associate chief justice — Selection and functions.

78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
78-2-2.
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78-2-3.
Repealed.
78-2-4.
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
78-2-4.5.
Admission to state bar — Criminal history background checks.
78-2-5.
Repealed.
78-2-6.
Appellate court administrator.
78-2-7.
Repealed.
78-2-7.5.
Service of sheriff to court.
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.
78-2-1.

N u m b e r of j u s t i c e s — Terms — Chief j u s t i c e
and associate c h i e f j u s t i c e — Selection a n d
functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed
initially to serve until the first general election held more t h a n
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten
years and commences on the first Monday in January following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief
justice from among the members of the court by a majority
vote of all justices. The t e r m of the office of chief justice is four
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all
justices of tho Supreme Court.
(4) If t h e justices are unable to elect a chiefjustice within 30
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this

78-2-2

section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by
law.
* (6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The
associate chief justice may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice.
The chief justice m a y delegate responsibilities to the associate
chief justice as consistent with law.
1990
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6.

Repealed.

1971,1981

78-2-2. S u p r e m e Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) t h e executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a s t a t u t e of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or t h e Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from t h e district court involving a conviction
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the m a t t e r s over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
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41-6a-1008. Vehicle crossing sidewalk — Operator to
yield.
The operator of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the
right-of-way to any pedestrian and all other traffic, on the
sidewalk.
2005
41-6a-1009.

834
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U s e of r o a d w a y b y p e d e s t r i a n s — P r o h i b -

ited activities.
(1) Where there is a sidewalk provided and its use is
practicable, a pedestrian may not walk along or on an adjacent
roadway.
(2) Where a sidewalk is not provided, a pedestrian walking
along or on a highway shall walk only on the shoulder, as far
as practicable from the edge of the roadway.
(3) Where a sidewalk or a shoulder is not available, a
pedestrian walking along or on a highway shall:
(a) walk as near as practicable to the outside edge of
the roadway; and
(b) if on a two-way roadway, walk only on the left side
of the roadway facing traffic.
(4) A person may not sit, stand, or loiter on or near a
roadway for the purpose of soliciting from t h e occupant of a
vehicle:
(a) a ride;
(b) contributions;
(c) employment;
(d) t h e parking, watching, or guarding of a vehicle; or
(e) other business.
(5) A pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree which renders the pedestrian a hazard may
not walk or be on a highway except on a sidewalk or sidewalk
area.
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a pedestrian on a roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles
on the roadway.
2005

41-6a-1010. Unmarked crosswalk locations — Restrictions on pedestrian.
(1) A highway authority in its respective jurisdiction may,
after an engineering and traffic investigation, designate unmarked crosswalk locations where:
(a) pedestrian crossing is prohibited; or
(b) pedestrians shall yield the right-of-way to vehicles.
(2) The restrictions in Subsection (1) a r e effective only
when traffic-control devices indicating the restrictions are in
place.
2005
41-6a-1011. P e d e s t r i a n v e h i c l e s .
(1) As used in this section:
(a) (i) "Pedestrian vehicle" means a self-propelled conveyance designed, manufactured, and intended for
the exclusive use of a person with a physical disability.
(ii) A "pedestrian vehicle" may not:
(A) exceed 48 inches in width;
(B) have an engine or motor with more than
300 cubic centimeters displacement or with more
t h a n 12 brake horsepower; and
(C) be capable of developing a speed in excess
of 30 miles per hour.
(b) "Physical disability" means any bodily impairment
which precludes a person from walking or otherwise
moving about as a pedestrian.
(2) (a) A pedestrian vehicle operated by a physically disabled person is exempt from vehicle registration, inspection, and operator license requirements.
(b) Authority to operate a pedestrian vehicle on public
highways or sidewalks shall be granted according to rules
promulgated by the commissioner of public safety.

(3) (a) A physically disabled person may operate a pedestrian vehicle with a motor of not more than .5 brake
horsepower capable of developing a speed of not more
t h a n eight miles per hour:
(i) on the sidewalk; and
(ii) in all places where pedestrians are allowed.
(b) A permit, license, registration, authority, application, or restriction may not be required or imposed on a
physically disabled person operating a pedestrian vehicle
under this Subsection (3).
(c) The provisions of this Subsection (3) supercede the
provision of Subsection (2)(b).
2005
PART 11
BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION
41-6a-1101. P a r e n t s and g u a r d i a n s may not authorize
child's violation of chapter.
The parent or guardian of a child may not authorize or
knowingly permit the child to violate any of the provisions of
this chapter.
2005

41-6a«1102. Bicycle and device propelled by human
power and moped riders subject to chapter —
Exception.
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2) or as otherwise
specified under this part, a person operating a bicycle, a
vehicle or device propelled by h u m a n power, or a moped h a s all
the rights and is subject to the provisions of this chapter
applicable to the operator of any other vehicle.
(2) A person operating a nonmotorized bicycle or a vehicle
or device propelled by h u m a n power is not subject to the
penalties related to operator licenses under alcohol and drugrelated traffic offenses.
2005

41-6a-1103. Carrying more persons than design permits prohibited — Exception.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a bicycle or moped
may not be used to carry more persons at one time t h a n the
number for which it is designed or equipped.
(2) An adult rider may carry a child securely attached to the
adult rider's person in a back pack or sling.
2005

41-6a-1104. Persons on bicycles, mopeds, skates, and
sleds not to attach to moving vehicles — Exception.
(1) A person riding a bicycle, moped, coaster, skate board,
roller skates, sled, or toy vehicle may not attach it or a person
to any moving vehicle on a highway.
(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or
semitrailer to a bicycle or moped if t h a t trailer or semitrailer
h a s been designed for attachment.
2005
41-6a«1105. Operation of b i c y c l e or moped o n a n d use
of r o a d w a y — D u t i e s , prohibitions.
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped on a roadway at
less t h a n the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and
under the conditions then existing shall ride as near as
practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway except
when:
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle
proceeding in the same direction;
(b) preparing to make a left t u r n at an intersection or
into a private road or driveway;
(c) traveling straight through an intersection that has
a right-turn only lane that is in conflict with the straight
through movement; or
(d) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions that make
it unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge of the
roadway including:
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(ii) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a
criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under
1
this section; or
(iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe
m that the property has been used in violation of the
I
provisions of Section 41-6a-210.
13) (a) Property taken or detained under this section is not
E repleviable but is in custody of the law enforcement
I agency making the seizure, subject only to the orders and
f decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction.
I (b) When property is seized under this section, the
| appropriate person or agency may:
(i) place the property under seal;
(ii) remove the property to a place designated by
§£ the warrant under which it was seized; or
E
(iii) take custody of the property and remove it to
; m an appropriate location for disposition in accordance
is 1

with law.

2005

| 4i-6a-212. Emergency vehicles — Policy regarding veil
hide pursuits — Applicability of traffic law to
highway work vehicles — Exemptions.

41-6a-216

shall make rules providing minimum standards for all emergency pursuit policies t h a t are adopted by public agencies
authorized to operate emergency pursuit vehicles.
(6) The privileges granted under this section do not relieve
the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle of the duty to
act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator in like
circumstances.
(7) Except for Sections 41-6a-210, 41-6a-502, and 41-6a528, this chapter does not apply to persons, motor vehicles,
and other equipment while actually engaged in work on the
surface of a highway.
2005

41-6a-213. Persons riding or driving animals subject
to chapter — Exceptions.
(1) Except as provided u n d e r Subsection (2), a person who
is riding an animal or who is driving an animal-drawn vehicle
on a roadway is subject to this chapter.
(2) Driver license sanctions for alcohol or drug related
traffic offenses do not apply to a person specified under
Subsection (1).
2005

41-6a-214. Quasi-public roads and parking areas —
Local ordinances.

f(l) Subject to Subsections (2) through (5), the operator of an
(1) As used in this section, "quasi-public road or parking
authorized emergency vehicle may exercise the privileges
area" means a privately owned and maintained road or parkPlanted under this section when:
ing area that is generally held open for use of the public for
(a) responding to an emergency call;
purposes of vehicular travel or parking.
(b) in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of
(2) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance pro} the law; or
vide that a quasi-public road or parking area within t h e
|r
(c) responding to but not upon returning from a fire
municipality or county is subject to this chapter.
| alarm.
(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under this section
' (2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
without:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this
(i) a public hearing; and
m chapter;
(ii) the agreement of a majority of the owners of
1
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but
the quasi-public road or parking area involved.
only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe
(3) This section:
M operation;
(a) supercedes conflicting provisions under Section 41|
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits, unless prohib6a-215;
ited by a local highway authority under Section 41-6a(b) does not require a peace officer to patrol or enforce
| 208; or
any provisions of this chapter on any quasi-public road or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of moveparking area; or
I ment or turning in specified directions.
(c) does not affect the duty of a peace officer to enforce
.. : (3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of
those provisions of this chapter applicable to private
** an authorized emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a
property other than under this section.
2005
vehicle pursuit, apply only when:
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal
41-6a-215. Right of real property owner to regulate
under Section 41-6a-1625; or
traffic.
(b) uses a visual signal with emergency lights in accorExcept as provided under Section 41-6a-214, this chapter
j dance with rules made under Section 41-6a-1601, which is
does not prevent the owner of real property used by the public
[• visible from in front of the vehicle.
; (4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner
and not as matter of right from:
jPp- authorized emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle
(1) prohibiting the use;
jj^pursuit apply only when:
(2) requiring other conditions not specified in this
(a) the operator of the vehicle:
chapter; or
(i) sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6a(3) otherwise regulating the use as preferred by the
1625; and
owner.
2005
(ii) uses a visual signal with emergency lights in
accordance with rules made under Section 41-6a41-6a-216. Removal of plants or other obstructions
1601, which is visible from in front of the vehicle;
5
impairing view — Notice to owner — Penalty.
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his
vehicle has, in effect, a written policy which describes the
manner and circumstances in which any vehicle pursuit property any tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of
it that constitutes a traffic hazard by obstructing the view of
should be conducted and terminated;
an operator of a vehicle on a highway.
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained in
(2) When a highway authority determines on the basis of an
accordance with the written policy described in Subsecengineering and traffic investigation that a traffic hazard
tion (4)(b); and
exists, it shall notify the owner and order that the hazard be
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in conforremoved within ten days.
mance with standards established under Subsection (5).
(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic hazard
© In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, U t a h AdminDigitized
by
the
Howard
W.
Hunter
Law
Library,
J.
Reuben
Law is
School,
BYU.
ten days
a class
C misdemeanor. . *..
2005
i s t r a t i v e Rulemaking Act, the Department of Public Safety withinClark
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(a) unless Subsection (2) applies, slow down and check
that the tracks are clear of an approaching train;
(b) stop within 50 feet, but not closer than 15 feet, from
the nearest rail of the railroad track before reaching the
crossing if the tracks are not clear;
(c) obey all traffic control devices or the directions of a
peace officer, or other crossing official at the crossing; and
(d) before proceeding over a railroad grade crossing:
(i) ensure that the vehicle has sufficient space to
drive completely through a railroad grade crossing
without stopping; and
(ii) ensure that the vehicle has sufficient undercarriage clearance to safely and completely pass through
the crossing.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the driver of
any vehicle described in 49 CFR 392.10 shall stop within
50 feet, but not closer than 15 feet, from the nearest rail
of the railroad track before crossing, at grade, any track of
a railroad.
(b) While stopped, the driver shall look in both directions along the track for any sign of an approaching train
and look and listen for signals indicating the approach of
any train,;
(c) The driver may proceed across the railroad track
only when the movement may be made with reasonable
safety.

41-6-lOO.j

41-6-99. Designation of through highways — St<
signs, yield signs and traffic-control devic
— Designation of intersections as locatioi
for preferential right-of-way treatment.
The Department of Transportation with reference to sta
highways and local authorities with reference to highway
under their jurisdiction may erect and maintain stop sign,
yield signs, or other official traffic-control devices to designai
through highways, or to designate intersections or othe
roadway junctions at which vehicular traffic on one or more c
the roadways should yield or stop and yield before entering
the intersection or junction.
197
41-6-100. Vehicles emerging from alleys, buildings, pri
vate roads or driveways must stop prior tc
sidewalk area or street.
The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building,
private road or driveway within a business or residence
district shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving
onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across
such alley, building entrance, road or driveway, or in the event
there is no sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the
street to be entered where the driver has a view of approaching traffic thereon.
1978
j

41-6-100.10. School bus — Signs and light signals —
Flashing amber lights — Flashing red lights
— Passing school bus — Duty to stop — Travel
in opposite direction — Penalties.
(1) Every school bus, when operated for the transportation
of school children, shall:

(d) After stopping as required and upon safely proceeding, the driver shall only cross the railroad track in a gear
that ensures no necessity for manually changing gears
while traversing the crossing.
(e) The driver may not manually shift gears while
crossing the railroad track.
(3) This section does not apply at a:
(a) bear upon the front and rear of the bus a plainly
visible sign containing the words "school bus" in letters
(a) railroad grade crossing where traffic is controlled by
not less than eight inches in height, which shall be
a peace officer or other crossing official;
removed or covered when the vehicle is not in use for the
(b) railroad grade crossing where traffic is regulated by
a traffic-control signal;
transportation of school children; and
(b) be equipped with alternating flashing amber and
(c) railroad grade crossing where an official trafficcontrol device gives notice that the stopping requirements
red light signals visible from the front and rear, of a type
of this section are not applicable; or
approved and mounted as prescribed by the department.
(d) other railroad grade crossings excluded under 49
(2) The operator of any vehicle upon a highway, upon
CFR 392.10.
2001 meeting or overtaking any school bus equipped with signals
2001
41-6-98. Duties respecting crawler type tractor, power required under this section which is displaying alternating
shovel, derrick, or other equipment or struc- flashing:
(a) amber warning light signals, shall slow his vehicle,
ture.
but may proceed past the school bus using due care and
(1) A person may not operate or move any crawler type
caution at a speed not greater than specified in Subsection
tractor, power shovel^ derrick, roller or any equipment or
41-6-46(2) for school zones for the safety of the school
structure having normal operating speed of ten or less miles
children that may be in the vicinity; or
per hour or a vertical body or load clearance of less than Vi
(b) red light signals visible from the front or rear shall
inch per foot of the distance between any two adjacent axles or
stop immediately before reaching the bus and may not
in any event of less than nine inches measured above the level
proceed until the flashing red light signals cease operation.
surface of a roadway upon or across any tracks at a railroad
grade crossing without first complying with this section.
(3) The operator of a vehicle need not stop upon meeting or
(2) Notice of an intended crossing under this section shall passing a school bus displaying alternating flashing red light
be given to the railroad and a reasonable time shall be given signals if the school bus is traveling in the opposite direction
when:
to the railroad to provide proper protection at the crossing.
(3) (a) Before making a crossing under this section the
(a) traveling upon a divided highway;
person operating or moving the vehicle or equipment shall
(b)
the bus is stopped at an intersection or other place
first stop within 50 feet but not closer than 15 feet from
controlled by. a traffic-control signal or by a peace officer;
the nearest rail of the railway.
or
(b) While stopped, the driver shall listen and look in
(c) upon a highway of five or more lanes, which may
|
both directions along the track for any approaching train
include a left-turn lane or two-way left turn lane.
and for signals indicating the approach of a railroad train.
(4) (a) The operator of a school bus shall operate alternatj
(c) The driver may proceed across the track only when
ing flashing red light signals at all times when children
, the crossing can be made safely.
are unloading from a school bus to cross a highway, or
(4) The driver shall obey all traffic control devices or the
when a school bus is stopped for the purpose of loading
h
directions of a peace officer or other crossing official at the '
children who must cross a highway to board the bus, or at
crossing.
2001.
any other time when it would be hazardous for vehicles to
[
proceed past the stopped school bus.
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41-6-87.3.

B i c y c l e s a n d h u m a n p o w e r e d v e h i c l e or dev i c e to y i e l d right-of-way to p e d e s t r i a n s on
s i d e w a l k s , paths, or trails — U s e s p r o h i b i t e d
— N e g l i g e n t collision p r o h i b i t e d — S p e e d res t r i c t i o n s — Rights a n d d u t i e s s a m e as p e d e s trians.
(1) A person operating a bicycle or any vehicle or device
propelled by h u m a n power shall yield the right-of-way to any
pedestrian and shall give audible signal before overtaking and
passing a pedestrian.
(2) A person may not operate a bicycle or a vehicle or device
propelled by h u m a n power on a sidewalk, path, or trail, or
across a roadway in a crosswalk, where prohibited by official
traffic-control devices or ordinance.
(3) A person may not operate a bicycle or any vehicle or
device propelled by h u m a n power in a negligent manner so as
to collide with any pedestrian or other person operating a
bicycle or any vehicle or device propelled by h u m a n power.
(4) A person operating a bicycle or a vehicle or device
propelled by h u m a n power on a sidewalk, path, or trail, or
across a driveway, or across a roadway on a crosswalk may not
operate at a speed•, greater than is reasonable and prudent
under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and
potential hazards then existing.
(5) Except as provided under Subsections (1) and (4), a
person operating a bicycle or a vehicle or device propelled by
human power on a sidewalk, path, or trail, or across a roadway
on a crosswalk, has all the rights and duties applicable to a
pedestrian under the same circumstances.
2001
41-6-87.4.

B i c y c l e s — P a r k i n g o n sidewalk, r o a d w a y —
Prohibitions.
(1) A person may park a bicycle on a sidewalk unless
prohibited or restricted by an official traffic-control device.
(2) A bicycle parked on a sidewalk may not impede the
normal and reasonable movement of pedestrian or other
traffic.
(3) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway at any angle to
the curb or edge of the roadway at any location where parking
is allowed.
(4) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway abreast of
another bicycle or bicycles near the side of the roadway at any
location where parking is allowed.
(5) A bicycle may not be parked on a roadway in a manner
as to obstruct the movement of a legally parked motor vehicle.
(6) In all other respects, bicycles parked anywhere on a
highway shall conform with the provisions of Article 14 of this
chapter, regarding the parking of vehicles.
1987
41-6-87.5.

B i c y c l e s a n d m o p e d s — Turns — D e s i g n a t e d
lanes.
(1) A person riding a bicycle or moped and intending to turn
left shall comply with Section 41-6-66 or Subsection (2).
(2) A person riding a bicycle or moped intending to t u r n left
shall approach t h e t u r n as close as practicable to the right
curb or edge of the roadway. After proceeding across the
intersecting roadway, to the far corner of the curb or intersection of the roadway edges, the bicyclist or moped operator
shall stop, as far out of the way of traffic as practical. After
stopping he shall yield to any traffic proceeding in either
direction along t h e roadway he had been using. After yielding
and complying with any official traffic-control device or peace
officer regulating traffic, he may proceed in the new direction.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) and (2), the Department of Transportation and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause official traffic-control devices to be
placed and require and direct that a specific course be traveled
by turning bicycles and mopeds. When the devices are placed,
a person may not t u r n a bicycle other t h a n as directed by the
devices.
1987

41-6-90

41-6-87.7.

Bicycles a n d m o p e d s — T u r n s i g n a l s — Exceptions.
(1) Except as provided in this section, a person riding a
bicycle or moped shall comply with Section 41-6-69.
(2) A person is not required to signal by hand and arm.
continuously if the hand is needed in the control or operation
of the bicycle or moped.
(3) A person operating a bicycle or moped and who is
stopped in a lane designated for turning traffic only is not
required to signal prior to making the turning movement.
2001

41-6-87.8.

Bicycle and m o p e d i n s p e c t i o n s — At r e q u e s t
of officer.
A peace officer may at any time upon reasonable cause to
believe t h a t a bicycle or moped is unsafe or not equipped as
required by law, or that its equipment is not in proper
adjustment or repair, require the person riding the bicycle or
moped to stop and submit the bicycle or moped to an inspection and a test as appropriate.
1987
41-6-87.9.

Bicycle r a c i n g — W h e n approved — Prohibit i o n s — E x c e p t i o n s — Authorized e x e m p t i o n s
from traffic l a w s .
(1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited under Section
41-6-51, except as authorized in this section. .
(2) Bicycle racing on a highway is permitted when a racing
event is approved by state or local authorities on any highway
under their respective jurisdictions. Approval of bicycle highway racing events may be granted only under conditions
which assure reasonable safety for all race participants,
spectators, and other highway users, and which prevent
unreasonable interference with traffic flow which would seriously inconvenience other highway users.
(3) By agreement with the approving authority, participants in an approved bicycle highway racing event may be
exempted from compliance with any traffic laws otherwise
applicable, if traffic control is adequate to assure the safety of
all highway users.
1987
41-6-88.

B i c y c l e s and m o p e d s — C a r r y i n g bundle —
One hand o n h a n d l e b a r s .
A person operating a bicycle or moped may not carry any
package, bundle, or article which prevents the use of both
hands in the control and operation of the bicycle or moped. A
person operating a bicycle or moped shall keep at least one
hand on the handlebars at all times.
1987
41-6-89.

Bicycle — Prohibited equipment — Brakes
required.
(1) A bicycle may not be equipped with, and a person may
not use upon a bicycle, any siren or whistle.
(2) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake or brakes
which enable its driver to stop the bicycle within 25 feet from
a speed of 10 miles per hour on dry, level, clean pavement.
1987

41-6-90.

B i c y c l e s — L a m p s a n d reflective material required.
(1) Every bicycle in use at the times described in Section
41-6-118 shall be equipped with a:
(a) lamp of a type approved by the department which is
on the front emitting a white light visible from a distance
of at least 500 feet to the front; and
(b) (i) red reflector of a type approved by the department which is visible for 500 feet to the rear when
directly in front of lawful lower beams of head lamps
on a motor vehicle; or
(ii) red taillight designed for use on a bicycle and
emitting flashing or nonflashing light visible from a
distance of 500 feet to the rear.
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Vehicle c r o s s i n g s i d e w a l k — O p e r a t o r t o
yield.
The operator of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the
right-of-way to any pedestrian and all other traffic on the
sidewalk.
1987
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41-6-80.5.

41-6-81.

Repealed.

1987

41-6-82.

U s e of r o a d w a y b y p e d e s t r i a n s — P r o h i b i t e d
activities.
(1) Where there is a sidewalk provided and its use is
practicable, a pedestrian may not walk along and upon an
adjacent roadway.
(2) Where a sidewalk is not provided, a pedestrian walking
along and upon a highway shall walk only on a shoulder, as far
as practicable from the edge of the roadway.
(3) Where neither a sidewalk or a shoulder is available, a
pedestrian walking along or upon a highway shall walk as
near as practicable to an outside edge of the roadway, and if on
a two-way roadway, shall walk only on the left side of the
roadway.
(4) A person may not sit, stand, or loiter in or near a
roadway for the purpose of soliciting from the occupant of any
vehicle a ride, contributions, employment, the parking, watching, or guarding of a vehicle, or other business.
(5) A pedestrian who is under t h e influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree which renders him a hazard may not walk or
be upon a highway except on a sidewalk or sidewalk area.
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a pedestrian upon a roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all
vehicles upon the roadway.
1987
41-6-82.10. U n m a r k e d c r o s s w a l k l o c a t i o n s — R e s t r i c tions on pedestrian.
The Department of Transportation and local authorities in
their respective jurisdictions m a y after an engineering and
traffic investigation designate unmarked crosswalk locations
where pedestrian crossing is prohibited or where pedestrians
shall yield t h e right-of-way to vehicles. The restrictions are
effective only when official traffic-control devices indicating
the restrictions are in place.
1987
41-6-82.50. P e d e s t r i a n v e h i c l e s .
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Pedestrian vehicle" means any self-propelled conveyance designed, manufactured, and intended for the
exclusive use of persons with a physical.disability, but the
vehicle may not:
(i) exceed 48 inches in width;
(ii) have an engine or motor with more t h a n 300
cubic centimeters displacement or with more than 12
brake horsepower; and
(iii) be capable of developing a speed in excess of 30
miles per hour.
(b) "Physical disability" means any bodily impairment
which precludes a person from walking or otherwise
moving about as a pedestrian.
(2) A pedestrian vehicle operated by a physically disabled
person is exempt from vehicle registration, inspection, and
operator license requirements. Authority to operate a pedestrian vehicle on public highways or sidewalks shall be granted
according to rules promulgated by the commissioner of public
safety.
(3) A physically disabled person may operate a pedestrian
vehicle with a motor of not more t h a n .5 brake horsepower
capable of developing a speed of not more t h a n eight miles per
hour upon the sidewalk and in all places where pedestrians
are allowed. No permit, license, registration, authority, application, or restriction may be required or imposed upon a
physically disabled person operating a pedestrian vehicle
under this subsection.
1987
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41-6-83.

Parents and guardians may not authorize
child's v i o l a t i o n of c h a p t e r .
The parent or guardian of any child may not authorize or
knowingly permit the child to violate any of the provisions of
this chapter.
1987
41-6-84. Bicycle a n d d e v i c e p r o p e l l e d b y h u m a n p o w e r
and m o p e d r i d e r s subject to c h a p t e r — Exception.
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2) or as otherwise
specified under this article, a person operating a bicycle or any
vehicle or device propelled by h u m a n power or a moped h a s all
the rights and is subject to the provisions of this chapter
applicable to the operator of any other vehicle.
(2) A person operating a nonmotorized bicycle or any vehicle or device propelled by h u m a n power is not subject to the
penalties related to operator licenses under alcohol and drugrelated traffic offenses.
1997
41-6-85.

Carrying m o r e persons than design permits
prohibited — Exception.
A bicycle or moped m a y not be used to carry more persons a t
one time than the number for which it is designed or equipped,
except that an adult rider m a y carry a child securely attached
to his person in a back pack or sling.
- 1987

41-6-86. P e r s o n s o n b i c y c l e s , m o p e d s , s k a t e s , a n d s l e d s
not to a t t a c h to m o v i n g vehicles — Exception.
(1) A person riding a bicycle, moped, coaster, skate board,
roller skates, sled, or toy vehicle may not attach it or himself
to any moving vehicle upon a highway.
(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or
semitrailer to a bicycle or moped if that trailer or semitrailer
h a s been designed for attachment.
1987
41-6-87.

O p e r a t i o n of b i c y c l e o r m o p e d o n a n d u s e of
roadway — Duties, prohibitions.
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway
a t less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place
and under the conditions then existing shall ride as near as
practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway except
when:
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle
proceeding in the same direction;
(b) preparing to m a k e a left turn at an intersection or
into a private road or driveway;
(c) traveling straight through an intersection t h a t h a s
a right-turn only lane t h a t is in conflict with the straight
through movement; or
(d) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions that m a k e
it unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge of the
roadway including fixed or moving objects, parked or
moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface
hazards, or a lane t h a t is too narrow for a bicycle and a
vehicle to travel safely side by side within the lane.
(2) A person operating a bicycle or moped on a highway
shall operate in the designated direction of traffic.
(3) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway m a y
not ride more than two abreast except on paths or p a r t s of
roadways set aside for t h e exclusive use of bicycles. Persons
riding two abreast may not impede the normal and reasonable
movement of traffic and shall ride within a single lane.
(4) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent
to a roadway,, bicycle riders may be directed by official trafficcontrol devices to use t h e p a t h and not the roadway.
2001
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(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or
parking;
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or
official traffic-control devices;
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for
use by traffic moving in one direction under Section
41-6-60;
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public
parks, which supersede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed
. limits;
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or
designating any intersection or junction of roadways as a
stop or yield intersection or junction;
(g) restricting t h e use of highways under Section 72-7408;
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring
the registration and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee;
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or
specified types of vehicles;
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section
41-6-48;
(k) requiring written accident reports under Section
.£1-6-42;
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59;
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlledaccess roadways by any class or kind of traffic under
Section 41-6-65;
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled
streets by any class or kind of traffic found to be incompatible with the normal and safe movement of traffic;
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under Subsection 41-6-49(3);
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets;
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in
a business district or any designated highway except in a
crosswalk under Section 41-6-77;
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at unmarked crosswalks under Section 41-6-82.10;
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts;
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds,
skateboards, and other toy vehicles;
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or experimental
ordinances as necessary to cover emergencies or special
conditions;
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding
maximum speed limits; or
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically
authorized by this chapter.
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official
traffic-control device at any location which requires the traffic
on any state highway to stop before entering or crossing any
intersecting highway unless approval in writing has first been
obtained from the Department of Transportation.
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f),
(g)» (i)j (j)> (1), (m), (n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official
traffic-control devices giving notice of the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the entrances to the highway or
part of it affected as is appropriate.
2001
Quasi-public roads and p a r k i n g a r e a s — Local o r d i n a n c e s .
(1) As used in this section, "quasi-public road or parking
area" means a privately-owned and maintained road or parking area that is generally held open for use of the public for
purposes of vehicular travel or parking.
(2) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance provide that a quasi-public road or parking area within the (
city or county is subject to this chapter.

(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under this section
without:
(i) a public hearing; and
(ii) the agreement of a majority of the owners of
the quasi-public road or parking area involved.
(3) The department is not required under this section to
patrol or enforce any provisions of this chapter on any quasipublic road or parking area, but is required to enforce those
provisions of this chapter applicable to private property other
than under this section.
1999
41-6-18.

R i g h t of real property o w n e r to regulate traffic.
This chapter does not prevent the owner of real property
used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner and not as matter of right from prohibiting
the use, or from requiring other or different or additional;
conditions other t h a n those specified in this chapter, or other-:
wise regulating the use as preferred by the owner, except as-may be required under Section 41-6-17.5.
1988
41-6-19.

R e m o v a l of plants or o t h e r obstructions imp a i r i n g v i e w — Notice t o o w n e r — Penalty.
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his
property any tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part ofJ
it, which, by obstructing the view of any operator, constitutes"
a traffic hazard.
(2) When t h e Department of Transportation or any locals
authority determines upon the basis of an engineering and;
traffic investigation t h a t a traffic hazard exists, it shall notify;
the owner and order that the hazard be removed within ten
days.
(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic hazardV*
within ten days is a class C misdemeanor.
1987/

if

41-6-19.5. V o l u n t e e r s may be a u t h o r i z e d t o enforcer
rce
c e r t a i n parking provisions.
ik- \
(1) Any law enforcement agency authorized to enforce parkons :
ing laws in this state may appoint volunteers to issue citations
for violations of:
(a) the provisions of Subsections 41-la-414(3) and (4) |
related to parking for a person with a disability;
(b) any municipal or county accessible parking priviivi\i
leges ordinance for a person with a disability; or
(c) the provisions of Subsection 41-6-103.5(4) relatedItpi
to« " 1
parking in a school bus parking zone.
(2) A volunteer appointed under this section must be) at:
at:
least 21 years of age.
«
\
:eer
(3) The law enforcement agency appointing a volunteer;
hat , s I
may establish any other qualification for the volunteer that*
the agency finds desirable.
;
:eer | |
(4) A volunteer may not issue citations until the volunteer!
Lent.; -^
has received training from the appointing law enforcement,
agency.
m
(5) A citation issued by a volunteer under this section has
has- ;,;icer Vthe same force and effect as a citation issued by a peace officer,
for the same offense.
1999;
1999 : i |

1

41-6-19.10.

Repealed.

M

1979

ARTICLE 3

41-6-17.5.

/ill

TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS, A N D MARKINGS
41-6-20.

S t a n d a r d s a n d specifications for uniform sys- %
tern of traffic-control d e v i c e s a n d school
c r o s s i n g guards.
(1) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, U t a h Admin- ;•
istrative Rulemaking Act, the Department of Transportation ;;
shall make rules:
Wl
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Rule 1

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

- The priority of cases for argument has been modified and
included as part of Rule 29, rather t h a n as an administrative
order of the Supreme Court.
- Definitions and procedures for the purpose of sanctions for
delay and frivolous appeals have been added.
- Gender specific pronouns have been removed.
- Sample forms and checklists have been included for some
of the more common appellate steps.
Notes drafted by the Advisory Committee further explain
m a n y of these changes. The committee's notes, although not
adopted as p a r t of the rules by the Supreme Court, may be
used as a guide for the practitioner.
Peter W. Billings, Jr.
Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES
R u l e 1. S c o p e of rules.
(a) Applicability of rules. These rules govern the procedure
before the Supreme Court and the Court ofAppeals of Utah in
all cases. Applicability of these rules to t h e review of decisions
or orders of administrative agencies is governed by Rule 18.
When these rules provide for a motion or application to be
made in a trial court or an administrative agency, commission,
or board, t h e procedure for making such motion or application
shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, U t a h
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and t h e rules of practice of the
trial court, administrative agency, commission, or board.
(b) Reference to "court."'Except as provided in Rule 43, when
these rules refer to a decision or action by the court, the
reference shall include a panel of the court. The term "trial
court" means the court or administrative agency, commission,
or board from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate
court" means the court to which the appeal is taken.
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or review of an order of
an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the
state which is inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the
statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall apply
to such appeals or reviews.
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals a s established by law.
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and abbreviated U t a h R. App. P.
(f) Rules for appeals in child welfare proceedings. Appeals
taken from juvenile court orders related to abuse, neglect,
dependency, termination, and adoption proceedings are governed by Title VIII, Rules 52 through 59, except for orders
related to substantiation proceedings under Section 78-3a320. Rules 9, 10 and 23B do not apply, but the other appellate
rules apply if not inconsistent with Rules 52 through 59.
R u l e 2. S u s p e n s i o n of rules.
I n the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court,
on its own motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may,
except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), 48, 52,
and 59, suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these
rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in t h a t
case in accordance with its direction.
TITLE H. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND
ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS
R u l e 3. A p p e a l a s of right: h o w t a k e n .
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments.
An
appeal m a y be taken from a district or juvenile court to the
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appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from ail final
orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law bv
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within
the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are V
entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests
are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint
notice of appeal or may join in a n appeal of another party after ;
filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court
upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipula
tion of the parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shallill
be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the
appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise
directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the
appellate court, the party making the original application 5 $
shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the
respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall .,
specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate ;i
the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall ' j
designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall ;i
designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal
j
shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving
j
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of \\
each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not
J
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
1
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be
j
filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served,
j
the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party ; i
represented by t h a t counsel.
I
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice
of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party .'..-A
taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the
]
filing.fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall
j
not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of t h e notice of
appeal and payment of the required fee, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of t h e notice
of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy of the bond
required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk t h a t the bond
has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt
of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall
be docketed u n d e r the title given to the action in the trial
court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title
does not contain the n a m e of the appellant, such name shall be ;
added to the title.
R u l e 4. Appeal a s of right: w h e n taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which
j
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court
j
to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
^
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days
||
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from, j
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory
1
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal
j
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of t h e trial
ij
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court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by
any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule
52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the
motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such
motion. Similarly, if a timely motion is filed in the trial court
(1) for a new trial under Rule 24 of the U t a h Rules of Criminal
Procedure; or (2) to withdraw a plea under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-6, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying
the motion to withdraw the plea. A notice of appeal filed before
the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect.
Anew notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court
disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as
provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed
after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but
before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is
filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal
within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by
paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by
paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of
the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in
accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10
days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later.
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an
inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in
either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is
timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail
system on or before t h e last day for filing. Timely filing may be
shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting
forth the date of deposit and stating t h a t first-class postage
has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner
provided in this p a r a g r a p h (f), the 14-day period provided in
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives
the first notice of appeal.
Rule 5. D i s c r e t i o n a r y appeals from i n t e r l o c u t o r y orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an
interlocutory order may be sought by any p a r t y by filing a
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the
case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial
court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A
timely appeal from a n order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, t h a t the appellate court determines
is not final may, in t h e discretion of the appellate court, be
considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission

Rule 5

to appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may
direct the appellant to file a petition that conforms to the
requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule.
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to
the Supreme Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court an original and five copies of the petition,
together with the fee required by statute. For a petition
presented to the Court ofAppeals, the petitioner shall file with
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals an original and four copies of
the petition, together with the fee required by statute. The
petitioner shall serve the petition on the opposing party and
notice of the filing of the petition on the trial court. If an order
is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate
court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the
order, together with a copy of the petition, to the trial court
where t h e petition and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of
appeal.
(c) Content of petition.
(c)(1) The petition shall contain:
(c)(1)(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the issue presented and the order sought to be
reviewed;
(c)(1)(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail, and
a demonstration that the issue was preserved in the trial
court. Petitioner must state the applicable standard of appellate review and cite supporting authority;
(c)(1)(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate
interlocutory appeal should be permitted, including a concise
analysis of the statutes, rules or cases believed to be determinative of the issue stated; and
(c)(1)(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may
materially advance the termination of the litigation.
(c)(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme
Court to the Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to t h e Court ofAppeals" shall appear immediately under
the title of t h e document, i.e. Petition for Permission to
Appeal. Appellant may then set forth in the petition a concise
statement why the Supreme Court should decide the case in
light of t h e relevant factors listed in Rule 9(c)(7).
(c)(3) T h e petitioner shall attach a copy of the order of the
trial court from which an appeal is sought and any related
findings of fact and conclusions of law and opinion.
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any
other party m a y file an answer in opposition or concurrence. If
the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to
the Court of Appeals, the answer may contain a concise
response to the petitioner's contentions under Rule 5(c). An
original a n d five copies of the answer shall be filed in the
Supreme Court. An original and four copies shall be filed in
the Court of Appeals. The respondent shall serve the answer
on the petitioner. The petition and any answer shall be
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered.
(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory
order may be granted only if it appears t h a t the order involves
substantial rights and may materially affect the final decision
or t h a t a determination of the correctness of the order before
final j u d g m e n t will better serve the administration and interests of justice. The order permitting the a p p e a l m a y set forth
the particular issue or point of law which will be considered
and may be on such terms, including the filing of a bond for
costs and damages, as the appellate court may determine. The
clerk of the appellate court shall immediately give the parties
and trial court notice by mail of any order granting or denying
the petition. If t h e petition is granted, the appeal shall be
deemed to h a v e been filed and docketed by the granting of the
petition. All proceedings subsequent to the granting of the
petition shall be as, and within t h e time required, for appeals
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Restatement of the Law — Torts
Restatement (Second) of Torts
Current through June 2005
Copyright © 1965-2006 by the American Law Institute

Division 2. Negligence
Chapter 13. Liability For Condition And Use Of Land
Topic 5. Liability Of Possessors To Persons Outside Of The Land
Title A. Liability For Condition Of Land And Structures Thereon
§ 368. Conditions Dangerous To Travelers On Adjacent Highway
Link to Case Citations
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an excavation or other artificial condition
so near an existing highway that he realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others
accidentally brought into contact with such condition while traveling with reasonable care upon the highway,
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to persons who
(a) are traveling on the highway, or
(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel.
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REST 2d TORTS § 343
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)
(Publication page references are not available for this document.)
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Restatement of the Law — Torts
Restatement (Second) of Torts
Current through June 2005
Copyright © 1965-2006 by the American Law Institute

Division 2. Negligence
Chapter 13. Liability For Condition And Use Of Land
Topic 1. Liability Of Possessors Of Land To Persons On The Land
Title E. Special Liability Of Possessors Of Land To Invitees
§ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known To Or Discoverable By Possessor
Link to Case Citations
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the
land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that
it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves
against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
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REST 2d TORTS § 343A
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965)
(Publication page references are not available for this document.)
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Restatement of the Law — Torts
Restatement (Second) of Torts
Current through June 2005
Copyright © 1965-2006 by the American Law Institute

Division 2. Negligence
Chapter 13. Liability For Condition And Use Of Land
Topic 1. Liability Of Possessors Of Land To Persons On The Land
Title E. Special Liability Of Possessors Of Land To Invitees
§ 343A. Known Or Obvious Dangers
Link to Case Citations
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the
fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of
importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.
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9.

Ms. Phitsnoukanh testified that she knew there was a sidewalk running along

Washington Boulevard in front of the teller exit and that she would typically look for pedestrians:
Q. Okay. Now, you had indicated that you did know that a sidewalk
ran across — ran along this street; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you ever seen pedestrians walking there before?
A. Most of the time I went, no. But I always pull up and look
and have never seen anybody walking past there.
A. It's a sidewalk. I expect to see people to walk on there, to see
people walk there. I mean, you never know when people are
going to show up on that sidewalk at a certain time.
(Phitsnoukanh Depo. at 19:6-14; 25:1-4).
10.

Ms. Phitsnoukanh testified that she was going "less than ten [miles per hour] and

more than five [miles per hour]" and stated that the reason she knows this is because there was a
"blind side":
A. Yes, because I try not to go very fast on there because I know
that's a blind side
Q. How do you know that it's a blind side?
A. Because sometimes it's difficult to see when anybody is
coming, and I want to make sure that I see it.
(Phitsnoukanh Depo. at 24:9-19).
11.

Ms. Phitsnoukanh testified that she would typically stop at a sidewalk even if there

was not a stop sign:
Q. Now, even if the stop sign wasn't there or if you did not see that,
are you aware of any law that requires you to stop — or law or rule
that requires you to stop at a sidewalk before proceeding out into the
road?
A. The law for me?
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Plaintiff denies these allegations by the Defendant. Dr. Gomer does indeed opine that
had Bank of Utah used a mirror devise, improved signage leading to a loud alerting signal for
pedestrians and bicyclists, as they approached the blind intersection, and better warning
information, the collision likely would not have occurred. See Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer,
filed contemporaneously herewith as Exhibit 2.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS

Pursuant to UTAH R.

CIV.

P. 7(c)(3)(B), Plaintiff also sets forth the following additional

undisputed facts showing that Bank of Utah did in fact owe Plaintiff a duty of care.
1.

Cameron was traveling at a reasonable speed on the sidewalk at the date and time

of the collision, approximately 3-4 m.p.h., and in a matter that did not pose a threat to any other
pedestrians or travelers upon the sidewalk. (Deposition of Cameron Smith, p. 21:13-23. True
and correct copies of cited provisions from Cameron's deposition are annexed hereto as Exhibit
3.) Cameron slowed down as he approached the "blind corner" in order to better see any
possibly approaching vehicle. (See Answer to Interrogatory No. 20, Ex. 1.) Cameron did not
see the vehicle until it was too late for him to stop or otherwise avoid the collision. (Id.)
2.

In his investigation report regarding the collision on March 31, 2003, Officer

Peterson described the accident as follows: "As [Defendant Phitsnoukanh] approached (sic) the
sidewalk, [Defendant Phitsnoukanh's] view to her right was blocked by the building of 2627
Washington Blvd. [Defendant Phitsnoukanh] did not see the bicyclist until the last second and
was unable to stop prior to hitting the left side of the rider." A true and correct copy of Officer
Peterson's accident report is annexed hereto as Exhibit 4.
3.

Box number 29, on the right side of the police report, contains the code u 06",

which according to Officer Peterson indicated "a driver's vision obscured and that is a building
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obscured the driver's vision." (Peterson Depo. at p. 38:13-15, a true and correct copy of which is
annexed hereto as Exhibit 5.)
4.

Defendant Bank of Utah owns the property situated at 2605 Washington

Boulevard.
5.

There are no warnings posted anywhere on the sidewalk to warn pedestrians or

others traveling on the sidewalk of exiting vehicles, or the potential that vehicles may enter into
the sidewalk area without advance warning. (See Ex. 2, annexed photographs designated
Exhibits B and C.)
6.

Some patrons exiting through the Bank of Utah's drive through did not stop prior

to entering into and crossing the sidewalk. A DVD-disc containing footage of Bank of Utah
patrons exiting the bank is annexed hereto as Exhibit 6.
7.

Even if a patron stopped at the stop sign placed near the end of Bank of Utah's

exit, that patron still could not see on-coming pedestrian traffic to the south, because of the
building directly to the south that limited a driver's field of view. (See Ex. 2, U 11.)
8.

In order for an exiting vehicle to see pedestrian traffic to the south, the vehicle

must first enter into the sidewalk area to see beyond the building obstructing the driver's vision.
(Ex. 2, annexed photographs designated Exhibits B and C; Ex. 6.)
9.

Implementation of simple measures, such as placement of a mirror enabling

exiting vehicles to see around the blind corner, as well as permitting pedestrians and other
approaching from the south to see approaching vehicles, placing warning signage and other
indicators to pedestrians approaching from the south, and otherwise warning exiting drivers of
the potential presence of pedestrians would have significantly reduced the likelihood of this
accident occurring. (Ex. 2, at Y& 27-29.)
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J. Paul Stockdale (USBN 3867) of
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C.

Attorney for Plaintiff
795 East 24th Street
Ogden,Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-1384
Facsimile: (801) 621-1387
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CAMERON SMITH,

AFFIDAVIT OF
DR. FRANK E. GOMER

Plaintiff,
vs.
PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH and
BANK OF UTAH, Inc.

Judge: Parley R. Baldwin

Defendants.

STATE OF ARIZONA

Civil No: 030906813

)
:ss

COUNTY OF MARICOPA )

I, Dr. Frank E. Gomer, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as
follows:
1.

I am a citizen of the United States, a resident of Scottsdale City, Maricopa

County, State of Arizona, and am over the age of eighteen years of age, and am in all
respects competent to make this affidavit. I have personal knowledge regarding all of the
matters stated herein, and would so testify at any hearing on the matter in the abovestyled action.
2.

The expert opinions and conclusions contained in this affidavit are

presented with a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, based, in part, upon
my review and analysis of:
a. The Complaint filed by the Plaintiff.
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b.

Plaintiffs Answers to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories
and Plaintiffs Responses to the First and Second Requests for
Production of Documents.

c. Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories.
d. The Original Accident Report, prepared by Officer Peterson.
e. The expert report based on a reconstruction of the accident
scene, prepared for the Defendant Bank of Utah, Inc. by
Ronald Probert.
f. Deposition transcripts, with exhibits, for the Plaintiff, Cameron
Smith, and for T. Phitsnoukamnh and B. Peterson.
g. Copies of 16 color photographs taken by Defense counsel, with
the assistance of Officer Peterson, about 8 months after the
accident.
h. Authoritative regulations, documents, and texts addressing: (a)
the operation of a bicycle on a sidewalk, in the state of Utah
(Utah Code - Title 41, Chapter 6); (b) the absence of any
ordnance issued by the City of Ogden prohibiting the operation
of a bicycle on a sidewalk; and (c) the known hazardous
condition, created when an exit roadway intersects a sidewalk
and one or both of the corners of that intersection are occupied
by buildings, which obscure visibility around the corner.
3.

The expert opinions and conclusions presented herein also are based upon:
a. A site visit to the scene of the accident, which I conducted on
March 15, 2004.
b. My education, training, and professional experience in human
factors

engineering and safety engineering; in forensic

assessments and reconstructions of personal injury accidents;
and in accident prevention methods.
4.

I received my doctorate degree in Human Factors and Psychology

from Washington University in St. Louis.

A true and correct copy of my
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curriculum vitae is appended to my affidavit as Exhibit A, and incorporated
herein by this reference as though set forth fully and at length.
5.

I am a professional member of the American Society of Safety

Engineers, the Human Factors Engineering and Ergonomic Society, and the
Safety Standards Technical Panel for Underwriters Laboratories.
6.

I also conducted safety audits at nuclear power plants across the

country, during which I specifically addressed safety hazards associated with
"blind corners."
7.

Human factors engineering is the engineering discipline focused on

optimizing the design of equipment systems and premises to ensure safe and
efficient use by humans.
8.

This engineering discipline applies a detailed understanding of

human capabilities, limitations, expectations, and preferences to the engineering
design process.
9.

Safety engineering is a complementary engineering discipline,

focused on identification and evaluation of hazardous equipment system and
premises conditions and on the implementation of effective hazard control
methods.
10.

I reviewed the hereinbefore-described information associated with

this traffic accident to determine whether the blind intersection of a sidewalk and
an exit roadway from the drive-thru area of the bank was hazardous, and whether
there were simple, yet effective controls that could have been implemented by the
bank to eliminate or substantially reduce the likelihood of a collision.
11.

During my review of the accident scene and associated

photographs, I observed the general condition of the area in question. A true and
correct copy of the digital color photograph taken during the site visit and
inspection I conducted is appended to this affidavit as Exhibit B, and incorporated
herein by this reference. Exhibit B shows the exit roadway from the bank and the
sidewalk in front of the "STOP" sign. The view is to the east, toward Washington
Boulevard. The building to the right of the exit roadway obstructs the vision of
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any driver attempting to look to the south, the direction from which Cameron
Smith was bicycling.
12.

A true and correct copy of another digital color photograph taken

during my site visit and inspection is appended hereto as Exhibit C, and
incorporated herein by this reference. Exhibit C shows the exit roadway from the
bank and the sidewalk, but the view is toward the northwest. The automobile in
the photograph is exiting onto Washington Boulevard. The sign in the median'
strip between the bank's entrance and exit roadways is directly behind the
"STOP" sign shown in Exhibit B. The location of the stop sign is several feet to
the west of the sidewalk.
13.

The Bank of Utah premises, which are the subject of this litigation,

are located at 2605 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah. Exhibits B and C show the
exit roadway from the drive-thru area of the bank and the sidewalk on which the
collision occurred. The accident occurred on March 31, 2003, at about 5:30pm,
as Cameron Smith was bicycling north on the sidewalk, to the west of
Washington Boulevard.
14.

Mr. Smith had ridden his Trek bicycle on this sidewalk about 3 or

4 times prior to the accident. (Interrogatory No. 23, Answers to First Set of
Interrogatories to Plaintiff, a true and correct copy of which is annexed hereto as
Exhibit D.) He stated that he was riding on this sidewalk because of safety
concerns, since Washington Boulevard is a very busy street. (Interrogatory No.
24, Exhibit D.)
15.

The driver of the vehicle that struck Mr. Smith on the sidewalk

was exiting the drive-thru area of the bank on the roadway shown in Exhibit B.
She stated in her deposition that, even though she believed she came to a stop
before reaching the "STOP" sign, to look in both directions, she did not see Mr.
Smith until after she struck him with her vehicle.

(Tanisha Phitsnoukanh

deposition, at pp. 23:1-24, 32:20-25. True and correct copies from Ms.
Phitsnoukanh's deposition are annexed hereto as Exhibit E.)
16.

Mr. Smith stated he was traveling slowly, at 3 to 4 mph, when he

saw the vehicle, suddenly and without warning, driving through the exit roadway
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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onto the sidewalk. (Cameron Smith deposition, at pp. 21:13-23, True and correct
copies of cited excerpts from Mr. Smith's deposition are annexed hereto as
Exhibit F.) He tried to swerve to the right but he was unable to avoid being struck
by the vehicle, and he was carried forward toward Washington Boulevard.
(Exhibit F, at p. 22:12-20.) The bicycle was partially pinned underneath the front
of the vehicle. ((Exhibit F., at p. 29:1-10.)
17.

The police report was prepared by the responding officer, Brian

Peterson, on the day of the accident.

(A true and correct copy of Officer

Peterson's report is annexed hereto as Exhibit G.) The report states that the
driver's view to the right (i.e., toward Mr. Smith before he was struck) was
blocked by the building shown in Exhibit B.
18.

There are no detailed accident scene diagrams and no photographs

included with the report. (See Exhibit G.) In addition there is no indication that
any braking-related skid marks, either produced by the vehicle or produced by the
bicycle, were visible at the scene, or that Mr. Smith was traveling too quickly on
the sidewalk when he was struck. (See id.)
19.

Mr. Smith was asked in his deposition and stated he was not

traveling fast enough to leave any braking-related skid marks on the sidewalk.
(Exhibit F, at pp. 24:24-25:8.)
20.

Officer Peterson estimated the point-of-impact to be 13 feet 8

inches west of Washington Blvd. (Exhibit G.) From the measurements I took
during my site visit, the distance from the west edge of the sidewalk, directly in
front of the exit roadway from the bank, to the east edge of the sidewalk, adjacent
to Washington Blvd., is approximately 24 feet 8 inches. The vehicle extended
about 11 feet onto the sidewalk when it struck Mr. Smith.
21.

Mr. Probert, an accident reconstructionist retained by Bank of Utah

to analyze the scene of the accident, opined that Mr. Smith, although having the
right-of-way, as opposed to the driver of the vehicle, should have been more
aware of the hazardous situation created by the blind intersection and should have
"done more" to stop or swerve to "...allow a vehicle to lawfully proceed across a
sidewalk." (A true and correct copy of Mr. Probert's opinion is annexed hereto as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Exhibit H.) Based upon my review of the accident scene, I do not believe that Mr.
Smith would have been able to see an approaching vehicle in enough time to
avoid the collision, because of the limited field of view resulting from the
obstructing building.
22.

Finally, Mr. Probert concluded that Mr. Smith had violated Utah

Code - Title 41, Chapter 6, by operating his bicycle on a sidewalk.
23.

Utah Code -Title 41, Chapter 6-87.3 specifically permits bicycles

to be operated on sidewalks, and it does not state that a bicycle must travel in only
one direction on the sidewalk. Further it states that a person operating a bicycle
on a sidewalk shall have all the rights and duties applicable to a pedestrian under
the same circumstances.
24.

There is no City of Ogden ordinance prohibiting the operation of a

bicycle on a sidewalk or restricting its direction of travel.
25.

The only part of Mr. Probert's report that has any value at all, in

terms of understanding why this accident occurred, is his correct assertion that a
hazardous situation is created whenever visibility around a corner of an
intersection is obscured by a building (see G. Marshall (2000), Safety
Engineering, Third Edition, American Society of Safety Engineers Press, Des
Plaines, IL, Page 155). (A true and correct copy of portions of the text regarding
intersections obstructed by buildings is annexed hereto as Exhibit I.) Marshall
notes that the best solution is to remove the obstruction, but when that is not
possible, the use of a convex or hemispherical mirror dramatically improves
visibility around a corner.

The use of mirrors also is recommended by the

National Safety Council (see P. Hagan, J. Montgomery, and J. O'Reilly (2001),
Accident Prevention Manual for Business and Industry: Engineering and
Technology, Twelfth Edition, National Safety Council Press, Itasca, IL, page 27).
( A true and correct copy of relevant portions of this text is annexed hereto as
Exhibit J.)
26.

However these authors note that better signage and warnings

should be applied as well. For example, "SOUND YOUR HORN" signs are
necessary at all blind corners where the view of drivers is obstructed, as are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"WATCH FOR ON-COMING VEHICLES" signs for pedestrians and bicyclists
on the sidewalk. (Exhibit J)
27.

In this case, the "STOP" sign shown in Exhibit B should have

warned drivers of pedestrian traffic at this intersection. (Exhibit D) The use of:
a. a mirror device;
b. improved signage leading to a loud alerting signal for
pedestrians and bicyclists, as they approach the blind
intersection; and
c. better warning information provided to exiting drivers
are simple, yet effective controls that could have been implemented by the bank to
eliminate or substantially reduce the likelihood of a collision, by warning exiting
drivers and/or approaching pedestrians of possible danger.
28.

It is my opinion that the use of any of these methods, and ideally

the use of all three in combination, within a reasonable degree of scientific
probability, would have substantially reduced the likelihood of this type of
accident occurring,
28.

In my opinion, but for the lack of implementation of these simple safety

precautions, Mr, Smith would not have suffered his serious injury and either Ms.
Phitsnoukamnh or Mr. Smith, or even both, would have been aware of the impending
danger and avoided the accident.
29.

It is my opinion, within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that

Mr. Cameron Smith was seriously injured because the bank failed to implement simple,
yet effective controls to eliminate or substantially reduce the likelihood of a collision
caused by a known hazardous situation.
DATED this JO

day of June 2005.

DR. FRANK E. GOMER
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Figure 1. This digital color photograph, taken during the site visit and inspection I
conducted, shows the exit roadway from the bank and the sidewalk in front of the
"STOP" sign. The view is to the east, toward Washington Blvd. Note that the
building to the right of the exit roadway obstructs the vision of any driver
attempting to look to the south, the direction from which Cameron Smith was
bicycling.
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Figure 2. This digital color photograph, taken during the site visit and inspection I
conducted, also shows the exit roadway from the bank and the sidewalk, but the
view is toward the northwest The automobile in the photograph is exiting onto
Washington Blvd. The sign in the median strip, between the bank's entrance and
exit roadways, is directly behind the "STOP" sign shown in Figure L Note that the
location of the stop sign is several feet to the west of the sidewalk.
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orn A

1.

Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting

Memorandum dated May 17, 2005; Plaintiffs Opposition thereto dated June 10, 2005; and
Defendant Bank of Utah's Reply Memorandum in Support dated June 24, 2005.
2.

Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer

dated June 24, 2005; Plaintiffs P.esponse thereto dated July 1, 2005; and Defendant Bank of
Utah's Reply Memorandum in Support dated July 7, 2005.

The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and heard the arguments from counsel for both
parties makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Cameron Smith was involved in an automobile-bicyclist collision on or

about March 31, 2003 at approximately 2605 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah.
2.

Defendant Tanisha Phitsnoukanh was exiting from the teller drive-thru owned by

defendant Bank of Utah, and failed to stop or slow down as she went across the sidewalk and
struck the plaintiff on his bicycle.
4.

Defendant Phitsnoukanh had used the teller exit at least once a month over the

course of a year before the March 31, 2003 collision.
5.

Defendant Phitsnoukanh testified that before the collision she knew there was a

sidewalk running along Washington Boulevard in front of the teller exit and that she would
typically stop to look for pedestrians.

2 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

Plaintiff Cameron Smith had rode a bicycle along the sidewalk where the collision

occurred approximately three or four times prior to the March 31, 2003 collision.
7.

As plaintiff Cameron Smith approached the teller exit, he slowed his bicycle to

gauge traffic and to watch for approaching vehicles.
8.

Plaintiff Cameron Smith testified that defendant Phitsnoukanh was coming very

quickly looking down and that she did not stop at the stop sign or the sidewalk.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The determination of whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is a

question of law to be determined by the Court. See Lamarr v. Utah State Dep 7 ofTransp., 828
P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2.

Defendant Phitsnoukanh had a duty to yield the right of way to plaintiff Cameron

Smith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-80.5 and §41-6-100.
3.

Plaintiff Cameron Smith had a duty to operate his bicycle on a sidewalk at a

reasonable speed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-87.3.
4.

The legislature has not imposed a statutory duty on a landowner such as defendant

Bank of Utah to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk.
5.

Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a common law duty to protect

pdestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk.
6.

Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff Cameron Smith as

a matter of law.
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7.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to defendant Bank of Utah's

lack of duty to plaintiff Cameron Smith in this case and therefore, defendant Bank of Utah is
entitled to summary judgment.

Therefore, the Coun hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1.

Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer is

DENIED.
2.

Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and

plaintiffs case is therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
Each party to bear their own costs.

MADE AND ENTERED this

U

day of (^£$JP

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

THE HONORABLFPARLEY R. BALI
SECOND DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
J. PAUL STTpCKDALE &, ASSOCIATES

J. Paul Sfockdale
Attorneysvfor Plaintiff

I
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J. Paul Stockdale (USBN 3867) of
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C.

Attorney for Plaintiff
795 East 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-1384
Facsimile: (801) 621-1387
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SECOH0 DISTRICTCOURT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CAMERON SMITH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs
Civil No: 030906813
PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH and
BANK OF UTAH, Inc.
Judge: Parley R. Baldwin
Defendant and Appellee.

Notice is hereby given that and appellant, Cameron Smith, through counsel, J.
Paul Stockdale, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order of the Honorable
Parley R. Baldwin entered in this matter on August 4, 2005.
Plaintiff appeals the granting of the Motion for Summery Judgment in that we
believe there is an issue of material fact and Plaintiff Cameron Smith is owed a duty.
.
^ A

jdkdale
ix the Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL

VD18636019
030906813

PHITSNOUKANH,PHOUNSABATH
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL was mailed via United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the

ff^day

of September 2005, as follows:

Nathan Morris
Attorney for Defendant Bank of Utah
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Utah Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 140241
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230

Susan Anderson/Legal Assistant
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030906813

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I, Fran Burke, certify that on the 13NDday of September, 2005 that I sent a
certified copy of the notice of filing of NOTICE OF APPEAL, to the
Appellate Court.

Fran Burke, Clerk
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J. Paul Stockdale (USBN 3867) of
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C.

795 East 24th Street
Ogden,Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-1384
Facsimile: (801) 621-1387
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SECOND DISTRICT COUtfi

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

L0CI

CAMERON SMITH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

1 1 200S

APPELLANT'S DOCKETING
STATEMENT

vs
Civil No: 030906813
PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH and
BANK OF UTAH, Inc.
Appellate Court No. 20050797-CA
Defendant and Appellee.

COMES NOW, the Appellant, Cameron Smith, by and through his attorney of
record, J. Paul Stockdale, and hereby submits the following Docketing Statement:
1.

DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT: The appellant is appealing from

the Order of the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah dated September 6, 2005
granting summary judgment.
2.

DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: The Notice of Appeal was

properly filed on September 9, 2005.
3.

JURISDICTION: Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Court

of Appeals of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(a) because there is an appeal from a
final order of decree disposing of the case.
4.

NATURE OF THE POST JUDGMENT MOTION AND DATE FILED:
no

There have been no post judgment motions filed.
Appellants Docketing Statement
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5.

DATE AND EFFECT OF ORDER DISPOSING OF POST JUDGMENT

MOTION AND ORDER OF DISPOSING OF POST JUDGMENT MOTION AND
ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT:

There was no order

disposing of post judgment motions. Final judgment was entered on September 6,2005.
6.

CLAIM FOR DAMAGE: We believe the damages to be approaching one

million dollars.
7.

The Appellant appeals the District Court finding wherein the Defendant

Bank of Utah did not owe a common law duty to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a
public sidewalk and Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff
Cameron Smith as a matter of law. These duties Plaintiff believes exist revolve around
the design and construction of a drive thru teller wherein the Bank of Utah patrons would
use the drive thru to conduct banking activities then when leaving the Bank of Utah
parking lot cross a sidewalk before stopping at Washington Blvd. to make a turn onto the
street. The cars cannot see pedestrians approaching and most do not stop at the sidewalk
but instead drive dangerously fast through the sidewalk and stop only when they reach
the street. The District Court did not believe the Bank of Utah owed any duty to the
Plaintiff herein.
A.

The Appellant knows of no claim or parties remaining before the

trial court for adjudication.
B.

The Appellant states that the facts underlying this Appeal are not

sufficiently similar to the facts underlying any claims remaining before the trial court and
would not constitute res judicata or other claims.
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8.

NAME OF TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY: This Appeal is from an Order

Granting Summary Judgment by the Second District Court for Weber County, State of
Utah.
9.

STATEMENT OF FACTS: The Appellant was riding his bicycle on

March 31, 2003, on the sidewalk abutting Washington Boulevard.

Appellant was

traveling north on that sidewalk and crossed an exit from the Bank of Utah where he was
struck by an exiting vehicle. The Bank of Utah constructed or caused to be constructed an
outdoor teller and channeled patrons out an exit and onto Washington Blvd. The patrons
crossed the sidewalk before entering Washington Blvd. The design of this exit made it
impossible for patrons to see pedestrian or cyclists coming down the sidewalk. Bank of
Utah knew or should have known that the drive-thru presented a blind entry onto the
sidewalk where both pedestrians and bicycles travel frequently. In order for an exiting
vehicle to see pedestrian traffic to the south, the vehicle must first enter into the sidewalk
area to see beyond the building obstructing the driver's vision. Bank of Utah prior to the
collision took no simple measures, such as placement of a mirror enabling exiting
vehicles to see around the blind corner, as well as permitting pedestrians and others
approaching from the south to see approaching vehicles.

Bank of Utah placed no

warning signage and other indicators to pedestrians approaching from the south or
otherwise warning exiting drivers of the potential presence of pedestrians. Arrows were
painted on the pavement of the drive-thru directing the patrons toward the exit area and
onto the sidewalk. Only the arrows were painted on the pavement no stop sign or caution
signs were painted on the pavement area to catch the attention of patrons using the drivethru and warning them of an impending duty to stop for any potentially dangerous
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situation ahead. Appellant contends that the Defendant Bank of Utah owes a common
law duty to construct the ingress and egress to it's drive thru teller window in such a
manor as to protect the public traversing the sidewalk from the increased traffic flow
created by the Bank of Utah.

A settlement was reached with Phounsavath

Paitsnoukanhand and she has been released from this case
10.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A.

Did the Court err in finding that the Appellee owed no common law duty

to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk; and
B.

Did the Court err in finding that the Appellee did not owe a duty of care to

Appellant Cameron Smith as a matter of law?

STANDARD REVIEW
A.

This presents questions of law. This Court reviews questions of law for

correctness. See Jorgensen's Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872 (Utah App. Ct.
2001).

Schulz v. Quinntana, 576 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1978).
11. DETERMINATIVE LAW

Restatement (Second) of Torts §368
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§343 and 343A.
Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24,\8, 2005 WL 831747 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts, §343).
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah App. 1992).
Little v. UtahDiv. Of Family Serv., 667 P.2d 49
Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, f 15,67 P.3d 1017 (quoting Williams v. Melby, 699
P.2d723, 728 (Utah 1985)).
Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 272, 159 P.2d 149 (1945).
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Schuh v. Quinntana, 576P.2d855, 856 (Utah 1978).
Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 IlUd 42, 566 N.E.2d 1365 (1991),
Ziemba, 142111.2dat 50, 566 N.E.2dat 1368
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-19(1)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38
The Appellant knows of no reason why this case should not remain before the
Court of Appeals.
12. RELATED APPEALS: There are no related or prior appeals.
13. ATTACHMENTS: Attached to this Docketing Statements are:
a. The Court's Findings and final Order of the Court.
b. The Notice of Appeal.
DATED this Le ^ c l a y of October 2005.

J. Paul Stockdale
Attorney for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that the original and two copies of foregoing APPELLANT'S
DOCKETING STATEMENT was mailed via United States Mail, first class postage
prepaid to the Utah Court of Appeals and one copy to Nathan Morris on {f*

day

of October 2005, as follows:

Nathan Morris
Key Bank tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465

Utah Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 140241
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
/-',

V

;'V^^^"<^ '' C2**-C±^&r

Susan Anderson
Legal Assistant
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S. BAJRD MORGAN [2314]
NATHANS. MORRIS [9431]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant Bank of Utah, Inc.
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
CAMERON SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

SIP C 6 2005
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
BANK OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PHOUNSABATH PHITSNOUKANH and
BANK OF UTAH, INC.,
Civil No. 030906813
Defendants.
Judge Parley R. Baldwin

Plaintiff Cameron Smith, by and through counsel of record J. Paul Stockdale, and
defendant Bank of Utah, by and through counsel of record Nathan S. Morris of Richards, Brandt,
Miller & Nelson, appeared before the Court on August 4, 2005 to argue the following motions:
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1.

Defendant Bank of U t a h ' s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting

Memorandum dated May 17, 2005; Plaintiffs Opposition thereto dated June 10, 2005; and
Defendant Bank of Utah's Reply Memorandum in Support dated June 24, 2005.
2.

Defendant Bank of U t a h ' s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer

dated June 24, 2005; Plaintiffs Response thereto dated July 1, 2005; and Defendant Bank of
U t a h ' s Reply Memorandum in Support dated July 7, 2005.

The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and heard the arguments from counsel for both
parties makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Cameron Smith was involved in an automobile-bicyclist collision on or

about March 31, 2003 at approximately 2605 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah.
2.

Defendant Tanisha Phitsnoukanh was exiting from the teller drive-thru owned by

defendant Bank of Utah, and failed to stop or slow down as she went across the sidewalk and
struck the plaintiff on his bicycle.
4.

Defendant Phitsnoukanh had used the teller exit at least once a month over the

course of a year before the March 31, 2003 collision.
5.

Defendant Phitsnoukanh testified that before the collision she knew there was a

sidewalk running along Washington Boulevard in front of the teller exit and that she would
typically stop to look for pedestrians.

2
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6.

•

Plaintiff Cameron Smith had rode a bicycle along the sidewalk where the collision

occurred approximately three or four times prior to the March 31, 2003 collision.
7.

As plaintiff Cameron Smith approached the teller exit, he slowed his bicycle to

gauge traffic and to watch for approaching vehicles.
8.

. Plaintiff Cameron Smith testified that defendant Phitsnoukanh was coming very

quickly looking down and that she did not stop at the stop sign or the sidewalk.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The determination of whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is a

question of law to be determined by the Court. See Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 828
P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2.

Defendant Phitsnoukanh had a duty to yield the right of way to plaintiff Cameron

Smith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-80.5 and §41-6-100.
3.

Plaintiff Cameron Smith had a duty to operate his bicycle on a sidewalk at a

reasonable speed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-87.3.
4.

The legislature has not imposed a statutory duty on a landowner such as defendant

Bank of Utah to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk.
5.

Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a common law duty to protect

pdestrians/bicyclists using a public sidewalk.
6.

Defendant Bank of Utah did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff Cameron Smith as

a matter of law.
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7.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to defendant Bank of Utah's

lack of duty to plaintiff Cameron Smith in this case and therefore, defendant Bank of Utah is
entitled to summary judgment.

Therefore, the Coun hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1.

Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Frank E. Gomer is

DENIED.
2.

Defendant Bank of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and

plaintiffs case is therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
Each party to bear their own costs.

MADE AND ENTERED this

U
day of
of P^C^J
^ _ day

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
J. PAUL Sft)CKDALE & ASSC
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J. Paul Stockdale (USBN 3867) of
J. PAUL STOCKDALE, P.C.

Attorney for Plaintiff
795 East 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401'
Telephone: (801) 621-1384
Facsimile: (801) 621-1387
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SEP 1 3 2005

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CAMERON SMITH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs
PHOUNSAVATH PHITSNOUKANH and
BANK OF UTAH, Inc.

Civil No: 030906813
Judge: Parley R. Baldwin
Defendant and Appellee.

Notice is hereby given that and appellant, Cameron Smith, through counsel, J.
Paul Stockdale, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order of the Honorable
Parley R. Baldwin entered in this matter on August 4, 2005.
Plaintiff appeals the granting of the Motion for Summery Judgment in that we
believe there is an issue of material fact and Plaintiff Cameron Smith is owed a duty.

ikdale
it the Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL was mailed via United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the J ^ f day
of September 2005, as follows:

Nathan Morris
Attorney for Defendant Bank of Utah
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Utah Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 140241
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230

Susan Anderson/Legal Assistant
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